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Audits

External audits performed on the protocol + SDK, with every finding tracked through remediation. Future audits will be appended to this page; nothing gets quietly removed.

Apex source-level audit — 2026-05-17​

Apex performed a source-level review of actp-kernel (V2 at the time) and the TypeScript SDK. 12 findings raised; all closed before the V3 mainnet redeploy on 2026-05-19.

Findings + remediation​

IDSeverityAreaStatusRemediation
FIND-001HighPublish pipeline trust✅ ClosedOIDC Trusted Publisher + sigstore + SLSA provenance on all npm/PyPI packages (no long-lived API tokens)
FIND-002HighCI hardening✅ Closedforge build + Slither workflow + CODEOWNERS gate on actp-kernel and sdk-js repos
FIND-003HighCI hardening✅ ClosedSame workflow change as FIND-002; covered both code repos
FIND-004HighSmart Wallet AA bypass✅ Closed_requesterCheck enforces msg.sender == requester for state transitions; closed in level0/request.ts + BuyerOrchestrator.ts
FIND-005MediumFee bps validation✅ ClosedplatformFeeBps ≤ 500 capped in kernel constant; admin cannot exceed
FIND-006MediumMIN_FEE enforcement✅ Closed$0.05 USDC floor moved from SDK convention to on-chain check in _payoutProviderAmount (V3)
FIND-007MediumTag-driven publish✅ ClosedWorkflow now publishes only on signed git tags; sigstore provenance attached
FIND-008MediumDispute bond bps locking✅ CloseddisputeBondBpsLocked captured at createTransaction, immutable thereafter (INV-30)
FIND-009MediumMediator timelock hardening✅ ClosedM-2: timelock always resets on re-approval, closes the racing window
FIND-010LowSelf-transaction prevention✅ ClosedKernel rejects requester == provider at createTransaction
FIND-011LowCompiler bump✅ Closedsolc 0.8.20 → 0.8.34; closes four via_ir codegen bugs + TransientStorageClearingHelperCollision
FIND-012LowDocumentation gap✅ ClosedAdmin-only resolver functions explicitly documented
FIND-013LowSepolia kernel freshness✅ ClosedV4 sepolia kernel deployed to match mainnet V3 + 1 patch ahead for early validation
FIND-014LowSourcify verification✅ ClosedAll 8 contracts (4 mainnet + 4 sepolia) verified EXACT_MATCH
FIND-015LowAGIRAILS.md parser hardening✅ Closed256 KB input cap; maxAliasCount=10 on YAML library to prevent quadratic-blowup attacks
FIND-016InfoReceipts parser✅ ClosedStrict schema validation on inbound receipts; tampered payloads rejected

The numbers don't add up to a clean 12 because some findings were split (FIND-002 + FIND-003 both touched CI but for different repos) and a few info-level observations were tracked alongside actionable findings. The "12 actionable" count refers to findings requiring code changes.

How to read this audit​

For non-auditors, here's what the table is actually telling you:

  • High = directly money-affecting if exploited (e.g., AA bypass could let an attacker move funds as someone else).
  • Medium = exploitable but with constraints, or affects integrity guarantees rather than direct theft.
  • Low = correctness improvements, defense-in-depth, no realistic exploit path identified.
  • Info = observations / nits / future work.

Every "Closed" status is backed by either an on-chain change (kernel redeploy → V3) or a workflow change (CI hardening → visible in .github/workflows/). Verify any specific finding by checking the linked PR or commit in the actp-kernel and sdk-js repo history around April–May 2026.

Audit firm​

Apex — source-level smart-contract review specialists. Findings document delivered 2026-05-17.

The full audit report PDF is not currently published — it contains internal references and was scoped as a working document. The actionable findings index above is the authoritative public record of what was raised and what was closed. If you need the raw report for due-diligence purposes, email security@agirails.io with context.

Internal review program​

Beyond external audits, the team runs a continuous internal review:

  • Slither + Foundry coverage gate on every PR to actp-kernel.
  • Manual review by 2+ reviewers required for any change to kernel logic (enforced via CODEOWNERS).
  • Hypothesis stateful exerciser — ~600 random op sequences per CI run on the lifecycle state machine.
  • Cross-SDK byte-identical EIP-712 parity — every release verifies TS-signed messages decode in Python and vice versa.

See Testing for the full testing depth.

Planned audits​

No specific firm or date announced for the next external audit. The decision criteria:

  • Major protocol changes (V4 mainnet redeploy with significant logic changes) trigger a fresh audit before mainnet ship.
  • Annual cadence for security hygiene, independent of major changes.
  • Targeted audits for specific high-value subsystems (e.g., post-PMF token contracts when those exist).

When the next audit is scheduled, this page will be updated.

See also​